Orders, Decorations, Medals and Militaria

The ‘Maiwand survivor’ Abyssinia and Afghanistan pair awarded to Major-General C. M. Griffith, 1st Bombay Grenadiers, who took over command of his Regiment after Colonel Anderson was severely wounded; when the inexperienced Jacob’s Rifles broke and fled, Griffith was ‘Conspicuous in his Efforts to Steady his Men’ and motivate the Bombay Grenadiers to ‘Fight On’, saving his Regiment’s reputation and averting a total disaster; afterwards he reconstituted a fighting unit from the surviving Grenadiers and commanded it during the Defence of Kandahar City and the subsequent victory at the Battle of Kandahar

Abyssinia 1867 (Captn. C. M. Griffith. Bombay Staff Corps); Afghanistan 1878-80, 1 clasp, Kandahar (Lieut. Col. C. M. Griffith. Bo. N.I.) both fitted with contemporary silver riband buckles, nearly extremely fine (2) £4,000-£5,000

Charles Matthew Griffith was born at Poona on 19 October 1834, the son of Colonel Julius George Griffith, later General and Colonel Commandant, Bombay Artillery. He was educated at Cheltenham College, nominated as an HEIC Cadet, and passed the Military Committee at East India House on 4 February 1852. After being twice rejected for his weak English and Latin, he was admitted to Addiscombe on 6 August 1852, and commissioned Ensign in the Bombay Infantry on 8 June 1854, at the age of 19. He arrived in Bombay on 23 September 1854 for regimental service with the 1st Bombay Native Infantry (Grenadiers). From June 1859 he was variously employed with the Irregular Cavalry, the Sind Judicial and Police departments, and as Superintendent of Police for the Great Indian Peninsular Railway.

The March to Fortress Magdala
By 1868, Griffith was a Captain in the Bombay Staff Corps. He was first sent on active service during the Abyssinia Campaign, the most logistically challenging but among the best executed of the British expeditionary wars up to that time. He was given responsibility for organising and commanding ‘A’ Division Highland Transport Train, 1st Brigade of the 1st Division, Abyssinian Field Force. He also commanded the stretcher-bearers who recovered the wounded on 10 and 13 April 1868 from the battlefields of Arogee and Magdala.
He was created Brevet Major on 15 August 1868 and was four times Mentioned in Despatches:

London Gazette 16 June 1868: ‘The bandsmen and a party of Punjab muleteers were also organised under command of Captain Griffith and furnished with stretchers for the removal of wounded men from the field.’
London Gazette 30 June 1868: ‘Captain Griffith [and other officers] have distinguished themselves by their zeal and activity and deserve special notice.’
London Gazette 10 July 1868: ‘Captain Griffith [and other officers], Land Transport Corps, commanded the first Divisions that were raised, are strongly recommended by the Director of Transport Corps for the extent and value of their assistance.’
London Gazette 7 August 1868: ‘The working of the Train next comes into consideration, which commenced with the arrival of Captain Griffith, with the advance Brigade... The Train was divided into four divisions... and Captain Griffith commenced the formation of “A” Mules... Difficulties and disasters met these officers at every step. Mules landed without equipment in hundreds, and with muleteers of the class already spoken of. At that time these officers having no subordinates had to look to everything themselves... The pleasing task now remains of bringing to the special notice of His Excellency the names of such officers more especially deserving of his kind consideration, and whose efforts came under the personal observation of the Director, who from first to last, never failed... Captain C. M. Griffith, Bombay Staff Corps.’

Griffith was granted furlough to England from 10 October 1868 to 22 November 1870. After marrying and returning to India, he was appointed Brigade Major, Aden in November 1871, promoted Major in June 1874, and Lieutenant-Colonel in July 1877. In August 1879, at the age of 44, he was appointed officiating Second in Command of 1st Bombay Grenadiers, considered to be an elite Indian regiment smartly turned out in a uniform of red jacket, khaki turban and dark blue trousers with white gaiters.

Griffith accompanied his regiment to join the South Afghanistan Field Force via the Bolan and Khojak Passes in October 1879, experiencing the hostile, anti-British environment of the Kandahar region for many months. In July 1880 a column built around Brigadier Burrows’s 1st Brigade, which included the Bombay Grenadiers, was sent west to Girishk on the Helmand river. At the disastrous battle of Maiwand on 27 July 1880, Griffith initially commanded the Grenadier’s Right Wing, and then took command of the whole Regiment at around 3pm, after Colonel Anderson was severely wounded and evacuated.

Maiwand
Two months later, in mid-September 1880, the British, including some officers who had survived the massacre, revisited the battlefield. They found that the European and Indian bodies had been left to disintegrate where they fell, but, learning of the British return, local Afghan villagers had hastily buried them just days before in 40 separate shallow graves at the places where they had died. The battlefield was carefully surveyed and the graves plotted on the battle map, then opened and their contents recorded. The correlation of the battlefield survey with the unsatisfactory and evasive official despatches of the force commanders was so contradictory that each surviving officer was ordered to submit a written report outlining what he had directly witnessed. Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith’s official account is quoted below, slightly abridged, while extracts of accounts given by other officers mentioning Griffith are inserted in italics.

‘On the 26th July 1880, the force under Brigadier-General Burrows [personally brave but indecisive, cautious and totally inexperienced in commanding an all-arms force], which consisted of the following troops [2,600 men], were encamped at Khushk-i-Nakhud, which is on the road from Kandahar to Girishk on the Helmand and distant from the former place about fifty miles: E-B, Royal Horse Artillery [146 men]; Detachment [260 men], 3rd Sind Horse; Detachment [315 men] 3rd Light Cavalry; Detachment [46 men] Bombay Sappers and Miners; 66th Foot [473 men]; 1st Bombay Grenadiers [649 men, the largest infantry unit in the force]; and Jacob's Rifles [624 men]. It was generally believed… that an Afghan force, consisting of about 20,000 men and 36 guns, under Ayub Khan, was not far distant; but such was the enmity against us, that neither the political officers nor our own cavalry patrols were able to obtain reliable information either as to the correct numbers or the exact position of the Afghan force. However, information was received that a few ghazis and some cavalry of Ayub Khan’s advanced guard had occupied the village of Maiwand… and during the night orders were issued for our brigade to march on Maiwand the next morning [27 July] at 6:30 a.m. The position occupied by Ayub Khan’s army at this time was unknown. Owing to the large quantity of ordnance and commissariat stores which had been stowed away within walled enclosures at Khushk-i-Nakhud, and the loading of which took a considerable time, the force did not start punctually, and the sun was well up, and the heat considerable, before we were all off the ground.
The force advanced with cavalry and two guns of E-B, Royal Horse Artillery, in advance; the infantry in line of columns at deploying distance; baggage on the right flank; and the whole brought up by a rear-guard of two guns and some cavalry, each regiment of infantry giving one company as baggage guards, in addition to which there were guards over ordnance and commissariat stores and treasure. [The Bombay Grenadiers had to give up 180 men - over a quarter of their strength - for Guard duty.] The march proceeded until a village was reached about 9:00 a.m., … shortly after another halt was ordered and it soon became evident that touch of an enemy had been obtained. At this moment, to the best of my belief, not a soul in the whole force was aware that an Afghan army of upwards of 20,000 men and 36 guns were within a mile of us; but now this became apparent, for, with good field glasses, huge black moving masses, mistaken by many for trees, could be distinguished on our left front, and all haste was then made to prepare our force for battle.’

Though he soon realised that he was heavily outnumbered, Brigadier Burrows acted in accordance with British military doctrine by attacking the Afghan army, in order to force an Encounter Battle intended to disrupt the Afghan advance and inflict heavy losses:
‘A broad and deep ravine crossed the ground between our brigade and the enemy, and we were pushed across this; and on our artillery opening fire, it was speedily replied to by that of the enemy, who at once got our range. [The Afghan artillery was well handled throughout the battle and was a decisive factor enabling their victory.] It was about 10:00 a.m., and the [Indian] troops had had neither food nor water since the previous day. [In the haste to leave Khushk, supplies had not been issued by the Commissariat to the Indian regimental cooks.]
The sketch of the action of Maiwand, drawn by Lieutenant the Hon. M. G. Talbot, R.E. when the field was re-visited in September 1880, gives a good idea of the relative positions of our brigade and the enemy, and it will be seen that while the 66th Foot and four companies of Jacob's Rifles were fairly placed under shelter in a small ravine, the 1st Bombay Grenadiers and two other companies of Jacob's Rifles were in the open, and subjected to a terrific fire from both guns and small arms throughout the battle.
Notwithstanding this, and the heavy loss my regiment sustained, fully 150 in the fighting line alone [the evidence from the graves supports this - the Grenadiers in the battle line took 30% casualties before the line broke], they stood their ground with perfect coolness for four and a half hours, without firing a shot for the first two. For about the first two hours the artillery had it all to themselves; but it was evident our guns were not in any way telling on the enemy’s artillery, for their fire neither slackened nor did their aim become more inaccurate.’

Heat haze obscuring both targets and fall of shot was a major problem for both sides’ artillery, but less so for the Afghan gunners, as the Bombay Grenadiers and the cavalry had no cover and were silhouetted on the skyline. Enemy projectiles inflicted continued attrition losses on the native infantry and cavalry throughout the day, and the cumulative effect of these was a significant blow to morale. Having succeeded in bringing the enemy to battle, a bolder commander than Burrows would by now have pulled his fighting line back by bounds to more suitable positions around Mahmudabad, to concentrate his force and take advantage of the better cover and obstacles it offered.
‘As above mentioned, very many casualties from round shot, shrapnel and shell occurred in the ranks of the 1st Grenadiers [even though they were lying down, except when firing, and the officers were dismounted], and the fire was so heavy that dooly-wallas could not be got up to the fighting line to carry away wounded men. Up to this time the Grenadiers had not fired a shot, but had nevertheless withstood the terrible artillery fire with the utmost coolness. About 12 o'clock noon the enemy's regular infantry were seen advancing on our front and left front, while ghazis and cavalry threatened our left flank. We were now ordered to open fire at 800 yards. At first volleys were fired by companies; but after a few rounds such was the din that words of command could not be heard, and independent firing was carried on along the whole line. This fire at once checked the advance of the enemy and did much execution in their ranks, but their numbers were so great that they were able to press on and in time quite outflanked the Grenadiers. Our cavalry were now moved to the left, and their appearance at this critical moment arrested a most determined attack on our left rear.’

Brigadier Burrows made several bad decisions during this phase of the battle, During the initial deployment for battle he had unwisely split Jacob’s Rifles by detaching companies to form his brigade reserve, and he now committed his entire reserve to extend his fighting line. He positioned two Jacob’s Rifles companies on the far-left flank, beyond the Left Wing companies of the Bombay Grenadiers, two companies of which were wheeled back from the main firing line. These two companies of Jacob’s Rifles, which contained many new, raw, untrained recruits, were led by Lieutenant Cole, a junior British officer. Together with the two Indian cavalry detachments, they were the weakest link in Burrows’ battle line at the place where the Afghan attacks were fiercest.

The account of Lieutenant W. C. Aslett, 1st Bombay Grenadiers collaborates Griffith’s account of what happened in the firing line: ‘During the Maiwand fight I assisted Colonel Griffith in looking after the right wing. The Regiment lay down after the enemy opened fire with his guns. We did not fire a shot for a long time. The enemy’s shot and shell appeared to come from every direction, some almost enfilading us. While the men were lying down doing nothing, I tried to make out the enemy with my glasses, but, from the thick haze, what afterwards turned out to be masses of the enemy I took for plantations of trees. After some time General Burrows came up and ordered “A” Company to fire a volley at the battery which was opposite to us, but such a distance off that only the smoke of their firing was visible. As we were flanked by our artillery we got a lot of the shot and shell aimed at our guns. After an hour of this we were ordered to advance, but, after going about 200 yards, again halted and ordered to lie down. Our artillery that was on our right did not advance with us, but fired from behind. I now could make out with my glasses that what I had taken for trees were large bodies of men.’

Griffith continues: ‘About 1:30 p.m., being on the right of the Grenadiers, near two Royal Horse Artillery guns commanded by Lieutenant Maclaine, I saw the enemy bring up a battery of artillery and place them in a ravine about five hundred yards to my right front. With these guns were a regiment of regular infantry and numberless ghazis. I threw back the right company of my Wing [a correct decision, but it meant that the various Grenadier companies were now facing in three separate directions] so as to bring a direct fire on the guns and infantry; but the cover they were under was so good that they did not sustain much loss, until some time after they made an advance and appeared on the open. Our fire was very heavy and accurate, and more than once the enemy retired into the nullah again and would not face us.’

Aslett continues: ‘The mass opposite us advanced towards us. From their dark dress and regular formation, I fancy that they were regulars. When at about 800 yards we gave it to them as hot as we could, and after a short pause they withdrew, and changing their tactics inclined towards our left flank, behind which, but some distance off, a great mass of the enemy had already got. At the same time an advance of ghazis took place from the right front towards our right, on which was E-B, Royal Horse Artillery. Colonel Griffith wheeled back one company to face this attack, and the men were firing very steadily at them when the break-up came. The seventy rounds the men had in their pouches were quickly used up, and the first reserve was nearly finished. Owing to the rapid firing, the [Snider single-shot, converted to breech loading,] rifles became so intensely hot that the men could hardly handle them, and the breech action would not act. I was now engaged in supplying the fighting line with ammunition, as the bandsmen told off for this work did not keep them sufficiently supplied. I now noticed that our left had wheeled back almost at right angles to our former line, and that the enemy were working still round it.’

Burrows had ordered Cole’s two companies of Jacob’s Rifles and the Grenadier’s Left Wing all to wheel far back at a right angle, but as soon as Cole’s men stood up in response, they started to move rearwards in such confusion that Burrows had to personally intervene to stop the chaos and reposition them. Burrows was shocked by this brush with disaster, and told one of his staff officers that he would never dare to try to move Cole’s two companies again.

Collapse
Lieutenant Cole was killed by a direct hit from an Afghan cannonball. Soon after his two senior native officers were also dead, leaving a single Jemadar in command of the seventy or so survivors of the two Jacob’s Rifles companies.

Griffith continues: ‘At about 2:30 p.m., when we had been under fire for more than four and a half hours, I first saw a retrograde movement on the part of the two companies of Jacob’s Rifles on our left. The guns had long since been withdrawn for want of ammunition, and this left a large gap between the Grenadiers’ left and the cavalry right, which the enemy seeing quickly made a rush for, and it became necessary to throw back the whole of the left wing of the Grenadiers to meet this attack.’

The enemy infantry attack was too much for the leaderless Jacob’s sepoys to withstand, as they must have been effectively out of ammunition. They started streaming towards the rear of the Grenadiers, and set off a chain reaction in one of the Grenadier companies. It was too hot for the sepoys to run for any length of time, but none of the officers who tried to make them halt could stop the rout.

Aslett continues: ‘As I was returning with ammunition from the ponies, I was surprised to see a company on the right of the wheeled back companies of the left wing rise and at once lose their formation, and press back towards their present rear. I could not see over them to see the cause of this. I ran and tried to make them front and lie down like the rest of the regiment; they would not, and pressed back on the right wing.’

Griffith continues: ‘About the same time a most determined attack was made on the two guns on the Grenadiers’ right, and the regiment was ordered to form square [forming a square was the correct way for infantry to fight off flanking attacks, but with the companies already facing in three different directions and at least one disintegrating, it was simply impossible for the Grenadiers to follow the drill movements to form a square], but only succeeded in forming a V-shaped figure, in which manner the whole regiment retired very slowly, keeping up a brisk fire, but being subjected to a terrible cross-fire from the right and left.’

Brigadier-General Burrows stated: ‘The officers of the 1st Grenadiers exerted themselves in the utmost to steady their men. Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Griffith was conspicuous in his efforts.’

Aslett continues: ‘Colonel Griffith, the only officer I could see, called out, “Form groups.” The right wing then got up and looked round, but the left pressing on them threw them into such confusion that no formation could be made, and in half a second, how I cannot say, there was a struggling mass of the 66th, 1st Grenadiers, and Jacob’s Rifles, all pushing and shoving towards the right rear. They refused to halt and make a stand and even fire at the enemy who were coming close after us, but a few ghazis who came to our present front were at once bayoneted. Some one called out, “Let’s go to that village over there”…’

Soon after the retirement started, command of the Bombay Grenadiers passed to Griffith. Lieutenant-Colonel H. S. Anderson, Commandant of the 1st Bombay Native Infantry (Grenadiers), stated: ‘As I was retiring, a part of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, under Captain Mayne, charged in rear of us and cut up many of the enemy. The cavalry came too close to us; the infantry continued retiring without formation. I was then hit by pieces of a shell in six places, one wound being severe - Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith, Second-in-Command, being near me.’

Anderson gave his water-bottle to Griffith with instructions to fill it, and was incensed that Griffith, preoccupied with the challenge of taking over the command, did not do so. He continues: ‘Immediately I was hit a Havildar and four Sepoys carried me to the rear, and put me in a dooly, which they carried themselves across the nullah, defending me against the enemy.’

Griffith continues: ‘The line taken by the regiment retiring was a little to the then left of that taken by the infantry coming into action in the morning, but between the villages of Khig and Mahmudabad. I have seen it repeatedly mentioned that the Native infantry rolled up on to the 66th Foot. As far as my own regiment is concerned, I most emphatically deny this statement. The Grenadiers never went near the 66th Foot, but retired in the direction above mentioned. I have been told by a brother officer that a few men did join the 66th Foot in the garden where the first stand was made; but the number was so small as not to be worth mentioning. The main body of the regiment on crossing the ravine joined the baggage guards which were there formed up, and made a gallant stand, killing hundreds of the enemy who followed us up to the ravine, but who could not, in the face of our fire, cross it.’

The Bombay Grenadiers split up during the confused later stages of the battle. The main body, including Griffith and the regimental colours, retreating towards Mahmudabad along the line of their initial advance. Another part retired along the line taken by Burrows towards Mahmudabad - the evidence from the graves suggests that Griffith’s order to ‘Form Groups’ was obeyed, as one grave containing 70 bodies indicated where perhaps a company made its last stand, and another contained 40 bodies. Poignantly, seventy small skullcaps, around which the Bombay Grenadiers wound their turbans, were lying near the bigger grave. The smallest party of the regiment was mixed up with elements of Jacob’s Rifles and most of the 66th Foot, who retreated through Khig, some dying there in last stands alongside the 66th, some reaching the ‘hospital enclosure’ in Mahmudabad where most of the surviving officers from the two main bodies of Grenadiers had gathered together.

Retreat
A letter written from Hospital Kandahar by an officer, subsequently published, states: ‘At about half-past three o'clock in the afternoon our defeat was complete, and the survivors of our brigade - that is to say, the remnants of our three infantry and two cavalry regiments - were hurled into a confused mass of fugitives, endeavouring to gain the shelter of the walled enclosure, where in the morning our sick, wounded, and stores were placed. This place I have described to you as an oblong walled enclosure, about 80 yards long by 60 broad, and with stoutly built mud walls some 20 feet in height. Here Major Oliver [of the 66th Foot] made an attempt to rally his men… Captain Dick, who had charge of the commissariat stores, had made a sort of banquette of wooden cases and casks, from which our men were enabled to fire over the walls. To this piece of forethought I believe we owe the short and partly effective stand we made at this building, for it enabled us to check the advance of our pursuers, while the scattered Ubris of our battalions were making some formation inside. Here at least were the colours of the 66th, and those of the Bombay Grenadiers, still intact, and here were Colonel Mainwaring [commander of Jacob’s Rifles], Colonel Griffith [commander of 1st Bombay Grenadiers], Major Oliver, Lieuts Whittuck [Bombay Grenadiers] and Lynch [66th], Captain Mayne, and Lieut Reid, [both of the cavalry] all, or nearly all, wounded, but gallantly getting their men to rally and re-form and cover the retreat out-side this species of 'laager'… Meanwhile our ammunition was fast failing, and by the General's orders we slackened our fire, only delivering a shot or two when the enemy became massed and near enough to afford a certain mark for our rifles. Flaunting their standards, and with frantic yells and demoniac gestures, the standard-bearers ran in front of the serried masses of our foes, whom, however, we still managed to hold in check with our feeble fire.’

Realising that to stay put in the ‘hospital enclosure’ meant being surrounded and massacred, General Burrows ordered that the Retreat be sounded.

Griffith continues: ‘About this time the 66th and other troops on our proper right were seen retiring from the garden, and so a further retrograde movement was made; more particularly was this necessary as a hot fire was being poured upon us from the village of Mahmudabad; but after this the men became perfectly out of hand. It was now about 4:00 p.m. and every one was utterly exhausted, having been without food or water for nearly twenty-four hours. The baggage was seen steaming along the straight road to Kandahar, and the men followed. Advantage was taken of baggage ponies and camels to mount the wounded on, and many were in this manner saved.’

The letter continues: ‘In the front [of the surviving British officers], most of their horses bleeding and wounded, rode Colonel Mainwaring, commanding the advanced guard, Major River, and Colonel Griffith; while in the centre was General Burrows, doing all he could to cheer and keep up the courage of the men. With him were Lieut. Lynch [66th], wounded; Captain Grant [Grenadiers], wounded; Major Vench, and Drs. Burrows and Eaton, while Colonel St. John [the political agent] overtook us further on. With the rear guard, if such it could be called, were Brigadier Nuttall and the remnants of his cavalry.’

Griffith continues: ‘The enemy followed us up for some three or four miles, but not with vigour, being doubtless as much exhausted as we were. It is difficult to describe the terrible march of 45 miles in Kandahar performed during the night. Those of us who took the upper and more direct road obtained no water until we reached the Argandab river, nine miles from Kandahar; and no sooner had we slaked our thirst and continued our march than we became aware that that the whole of the villages of Kokeran, Abasabad and the neighbourhood had turned out to arrest our progress and to kill and plunder. The men seeing this, collected in groups, and, with the assistance of the small force sent out from Kandahar to clear the road, fought their way through. Many, however were killed or wounded and cut up by the enemy. On arrival at the cantonments of Kandahar, we heard that orders had been issued for their abandonment and every one was seen hurrying into the citadel, whither also we went.
It is quite impossible to give an idea of the terrible sufferings of those who performed this march after exertions of the previous day and without food or water; suffice it to say that those who eventually did reach Kandahar were utterly prostrated for many days. That nearly half of our losses, both European and Native, were sustained during the retreat, I think no one will deny.’
This is one point that Griffith unwittingly got wrong. In fact, the Grenadiers lost 26% of those who began the flight to Kandahar, but he was not aware that 100 or so of his native officers and men had actually died on the battlefield in ‘Group last stands’, which were not witnessed by British officers, rather than along the road to safety.

The Bombay Grenadiers suffered the heaviest casualties of any unit present at Maiwand: 427 out of 649 (or 66% of those present), with 366 (56%) being killed; the 66th had 268 or 61% killed. The Grenadiers and their officers seem to have fought just as hard as the rightfully praised 66th Foot. An estimated 140 Grenadiers (compared to 10 of the 66th Foot) became casualties in the battle line before it broke, 190 (compared to 216 of the 66th Foot) were killed on the battlefield after the break, and 97 (compared to 42 of the 66th Foot) died or went missing during the flight to Kandahar. 73% of the Grenadiers’ officers - four out of seven British 1st Bombay Grenadiers officers and 12 of the 15 Indian officers - became casualties.

Recovery
Griffith rebuilt the few hundred surviving Grenadiers into a functioning military unit, which took part in the defence of the ancient walls surrounding Kandahar city. During the sortie to destroy Afghan artillery at Deh Khoja, he was responsible for the men under arms at one of the city gates (Top-Khana). He led the two companies of Bombay Grenadiers that fought during the battle of Kandahar, when Ayub Khan’s army was routed and the Maiwand disaster avenged. As a result, Griffith was awarded the medal with clasp Kandahar and was Mentioned in Despatches (London Gazette 3 December 1880).

Griffith was appointed Deputy Assistant Commissary of Ordnance, Transport Branch, at Poona on 5 December, 1882, and was promoted to Colonel on 8 June 1884. He retired at the age of 50, with the honorary rank of Major-General, on 10 June 1885. Major-General Griffith died on 31 December 1913, aged 79, in Winchester.

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