The Superb Korean War ‘Battle of the Imjin River Hill 314’ M.M. group of seven awarded to Sergeant S. Robinson, 4 Platoon, “B” Company, 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment (‘The Glorious Glosters’), who, although seriously wounded, personally kept his four Bren Machine-Guns in action in an exposed forward position for over three hours, decimating multiple Chinese ‘Human Wave’ attacks until he collapsed over his own Bren due to loss of blood.

Originally recommended for a D.C.M., his award was downgraded as the War Office authorised just two D.C.M.s and six M.M.s to the Glosters’ other ranks, despite their heroic stand which blunted and ruined Mao’s Spring Offensive

Military Medal, E.II.R., 1st issue (1444977 A/Sjt. S. Robinson, Glosters); 1939-45 Star; France and Germany Star; Defence and War Medals 1939-45; Korea 1950-53, 1st issue (1444977 Cpl. S. Robinson, Glosters); U.N. Korea 1950-54, unnamed as issued; together with the recipient’s United States of America Presidential Unit Citation riband bar, nearly extremely fine (7) £20,000-£30,000

M.M. London Gazette 8 December 1953.
The original recommendation, for the award of a Distinguished Conduct Medal, was written by his C.O., Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Carne, V.C., D.S.O. and states: ‘Choksong, River Imjin, South Korea 22-25 April 1951 - Rifle Platoon Sergeant. During the night of 23-24 April, particularly during the early morning of the 24th April, repeated attacks were made by heavy Chinese forces against Sergeant Robinson’s platoon position. At first light, he was manning a light machine-gun in an exposed forward position. Despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, he maintained this gun in action personally for over three hours though wounded seriously in the arm and later, the leg. At the end of this time, through loss of blood, he collapsed over the weapon and only then was drawn to the rear. Due to his courage and selfless devotion to duty, this important post withstood the repeated assaults of the enemy until the order was given to withdraw to a new position. Sergeant Robinson’s conduct was indeed an inspiration to all those about him.’

Stanley Robinson was born in Chatham, Kent on 20 July 1920, joined the regular army and saw service in North West Europe during the Second World War. As a regular reservist, he was mobilised at Colchester in August 1950 for service in Korea with the Gloucestershire Regiment as a Corporal in “B” Company. The 1st Battalion of the Glosters sailed aboard the Empire Windrush, arrived in Pusan harbour on 10 November 1950, made its way to the front line north of Pyongyang, but was soon swept up in the retreat of the UN forces in the face of vast numbers of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers pushing down from the north. In February 1951 the U.N. forces went onto the offensive, recapturing Seoul and pushing up to and beyond the 38th Parallel, which had been the border between the North and the South. Robinson was promoted in the field from Corporal to be Platoon Sergeant of Lieutenant Geoffrey Costello’s No. 4 Platoon, “B” Company.

The Glosters were deployed on the U.N. front line along the Imjin River when the Chinese Spring Offensive opened on the evening of 22 April 1951. The Glosters’ position covered a classic invasion route from the north, as Seoul was just thirty miles away to the south. Furthermore, it formed a pivot in the Allied line, which abruptly changed direction from west-east by suddenly running due north. The 29th Independent British Brigade had been allocated twelve miles of west-east-north front, comprising steep hills intersected by deep valleys. It was impossible to man a continuous defensive line, so Brigadier Brodie decided to deploy each of his infantry battalions on separate areas of key high ground, relying on his artillery and tanks to cover the wide gaps between them, including the dominating 675m-high feature called Kamak San. Ominously, there was a very wide gap between the Glosters to the west of the Brigade area and the other three battalions who were safeguarding the main north-south highway (Route 11) to the east.

Like his Brigadier, Lieutenant Colonel Carne, commanding 1st Glosters, appreciated that in order to hold vital ground he could not concentrate his infantry companies. Defence stores such as wire and anti-personnel mines were in short supply and the Glosters’ company positions were not as secure as he wanted them to be. Carne’s main objective was to cover the approaches to the defile and track running south through the hills which offered the fastest way to reach flatter country around Seoul. Ideally Carne wanted to occupy Kamak San, but his manpower was insufficient to do so. He placed “A” Company on Castle Hill, which covered the main crossing point along the Imjin River about 2,000 yards to the north, and “B” Company on its right flank to cover the two-mile gap between the Glosters and the next British battalion. The other companies were in depth or reserve positions.

The entire Chinese 63rd Army (about 27,000 fighters) was tasked to wipe out one British Infantry Brigade. During the morning of Sunday April 22, warnings were received of large-scale enemy movement north of the river, and 1 Glosters prepared for battle. Extra ammunition was bought up and distributed to the companies and both “A” and “B” Companies sent out fighting patrols closer to the river. Artillery and mortar targets were registered and recorded. All companies were placed at 50% stand-to.

The First Night and Day of the Battle
After dark on April 22, swarms of Chinese troops crossed the Imjin, taking massive casualties from artillery and small-arms fire aided by mortar flares. Undaunted by their losses, they pressed on, infiltrating along the gaps between the various British positions. The Gloster fighting patrols were withdrawn at midnight as their ammunition was expended. During the night of 22/23 April 1951, “B” Company inflicted crushing casualties on Chinese units which attempted to overrun their slit tranches, suffering no losses themselves. However, “A” Company was outnumbered by at least six to one, and after bitter fighting the Chinese established themselves in a captured allied bunker on the top of Castle Hill. Soon after dawn on 23 April the “A” Company Commander and many of his officers were killed and the survivors were in imminent danger of being overrun.

Colonel Carne was forced to pull back to his depth positions. At 0830 “A” Company - now reduced to only one officer and 53 men - joined him on Gloster Hill, while “B” Company fell back 1,500 yards to destroy the Chinese troops on top of Hill 314 and occupy it. But to their right they could see hundreds of Chinese moving around their flank towards Kamak San. Unfortunately, no air support was available. The redeployed companies - “B” on Hill 314 and the rest of the battalion on Gloster Hill - could still deny the enemy use of the vital track from the village of Solma-Ri through the hills, and the British artillery and mortars were decimating the Chinese throughout the day, but Carne was well aware that both flanks of his battalion had been turned and unless he was provided with air strikes and tank support his sole options were to surrender or to fight on until his ammunition, water and food ran out. No relief or reinforcement could occur without other U.N. units fighting their way forward. By 10.30 on 23 April, “B” Company had taken the summit of Hill 314 and were preparing their defences. During that day the Chinese 188th and 189th Divisions got ready for a fresh attack, whose main weight would be directed against both “B” and “C” Companies.

The Second Night and Day of the Battle
By dusk all Companies knew that they could expect a second night of hard fighting. In the fading light hundreds of Chinese could be seen forming up in the valleys and the sound of Chinese bugles was heard through the evening gloom. The main attack on “C” Company began at 20.30 that evening and for hours wave after wave of Chinese troops advanced against the defenders. It became apparent that the communist forces were relying on sheer weight of numbers to achieve their objectives. Despite enormous casualties, the Chinese finally overran two platoons of “C” Company, forcing Carne to further shrink his main position on Gloster Hill. Ideally “B” Company would have moved across from Hill 314 so that everyone was concentrated on Gloster Hill, but this re-deployment would be suicidal if attempted in darkness. Carne told the “B” Company Commander to stay put until daylight on 24 April when the move could be covered by friendly fire from Vickers machine-guns and the artillery.

After dark the Chinese had moved forward to the lower slopes of Hill 314 and lined up to climb its steep ridges, supported by their machine guns and mortars. The defensive fire plan had been carefully co-ordinated and the combined fire of the infantry, mortars and artillery took a terrible toll on the men climbing upwards. “B” Company continued throughout the night to hold their now isolated position as wave after wave of enemy infantry were halted in front of the Company positions, especially those of 4 Platoon. 4 Platoon was equipped with four Bren Light Machine Guns: excellent, reliable weapons fed by 30-round box magazines, which constituted by far the main fire-power of the platoon and came under the authority of the Platoon Sergeant during combat. Each Bren was intended to be operated by a two-man team, made up of a gunner assisted by a loader who spotted targets, changed over the box magazines and took various actions to ensure that the barrel did not overheat. In the absence of the loader, the gunner could still fire the Bren but magazine changes took a few seconds longer. Sergeant Robinson’s prime responsibility was to keep all his Brens in action, by controlling the rate and weight of fire, ensuring that empty magazines were correctly reloaded (an incorrectly loaded magazine could cause a jam) and redistributed to the guns and that gun-crew casualties were promptly replaced (every Gloster rifleman was also cross-trained to work a Bren).

Robinson stated that two of his Bren gunners were killed ‘early on’ and he took over and fired one Bren gun himself, while still controlling his other Brens throughout the night. He added ‘The Chinese Peoples’ Army used Russian methods, directed by tracer fire and bugles. The first wave had the weapons, the second picked up what they could from the dead. It did make life easier, but there were far too many of them.’ The artillery observation officer repeatedly called in ‘Final Protective Fire’/‘Danger Close’ missions, whose shells dropped less than 50 yards in front of 4 Platoon’s position. During the night, Robinson’s little party of Bren gunners occupied an exposed position and inflicted enormous casualties on the enemy. As Captain Farrar Hockley, the Glosters’ Adjutant, described in The Edge of The Sword: ‘The whole Company front is engaged by fire – fire from heavy machine-guns from ranges in excess of two thousand yards... fire from mortars and from light machine-guns at closer ranges. Meanwhile, the enemy assault groups feel their way forward to the very edge of our defences;... For hours this repetition of attack and repulse continues, the night wanes, the day begins to break. Little by little, a terrible fact becomes apparent to the men of the defence. This is not a battle in which courage, tactical and technical superiority will be the means to victory; it is a battle of attrition. Irrespective of the number of casualties they inflict, there is an unending flow of replacements. Moreover, in spite of their tremendous losses, the numerical strength of the enemy is not constant but increasing.’

Shortly after dawn on 24 April the attack was intensified against “B” Company, in particular No. 4 Platoon. A burst of small arms fire hit Robinson and his Bren from a flank, striking him in the shoulder and the area of the trigger and butt where his hands were placed one above the other to control his weapon. He was hit again in his leg and thigh. ‘He nonetheless remains at duty, giving the crew their orders in this new engagement until he loses consciousness.’ (Farrar-Hockley op cit.). One by one the strength of 4 Platoon was reduced and the little fighting groups split up.

Daylight allowed the Vickers Machine-gun section on Gloster Hill to come into action against “B” Company’s attackers. Shortly after 0800 Carne ordered “B” Company to try to break contact and rush across the valley to join the rest of his force on Gloster Hill. It was a difficult order to execute; Lieutenant Costello’s 4 Platoon had borne the brunt of the attack on Hill 314 and were still in close physical contact with the enemy. To reach Gloster Hill, “B” Company would have to break through the ranks of Chinese assault troops in the valley below. Hill 314 had a steep reverse slope which forced the components of “B” Company to evacuate by breaking up further into small parties. When they reached the track far below, they had to run through heavy fire from both flanks. Only a group of twenty men under the “B” Company Commander managed to fight their way through to Colonel Carne for the Last Stand on Gloster Hill. Carne held out until 25 April, when after sixty hours of fighting he ordered his men to breakout and try to reach U.N. rearguard positions. 80% of the total fighting strength of the Glosters (about 700 all ranks) were taken prisoner; only 11% escaped, with 9% killed in action. Those 700 warriors are estimated to have inflicted 11,000 casualties on the enemy.

The Chinese Spring Offensive was irreparably damaged by the casualties that the P.L.A. had suffered at the hands of 29th British Brigade. Their 63rd Army lost over a third of its strength and was pulled out. The P.L.A. failed in their bid to capture Seoul and were soon retreating northwards again. All the United Nations troops had resisted fiercely, but the British had fought the most ferociously, held out the most tenaciously, inflicted the highest casualties, and won the greatest fame.

In Durance Vile
When Robinson regained consciousness, the C.O.’s evacuation order had been received and, as he was still just about able to walk, Robinson was told to make his own way down the reverse slope of Hill 314. As he was painfully picking his way, trying to remain upright on the steep and treacherous rock, he came across Private Lionel Essex, a young regular soldier from 4 Platoon who had been wounded in the head during the bitter night fighting. Just after dawn, when the position was critical and it seemed that 4 Platoon would be overrun, Essex was told by Lieutenant Costello, the Platoon Commander, to make his way down the reverse slope. About half-way down Essex was hit in the left leg. While he was examining his wound, another bullet broke his right leg and he was effectively immobilised.

Robinson decided to remain behind on the slopes of Hill 314 to assist Private Essex. He found some cover and dragged Essex into its concealment. Both men managed to hide from the Chinese who had overrun “B” Company's position. However, only Robinson could walk, and they badly needed food and water. Later in the day Robinson went off to scout and perhaps seek help from the local Korean villagers, who were friendly. He ran into Chinese soldiers and was captured. After two nights on the mountainside, Essex crawled down the hill to a village. He was looked after by the locals, remained at liberty for nearly a month and succeeded in re-joining the British Brigade, one of only three men to return many days after the battle was long over.

Robinson was marched north, 20-25 miles each night, with little food (soya-bean flour and sorghum) and no medical attention, at least initially. He was not treated any worse than the Chinese treated their own casualties and was eventually operated on by Chinese doctors doing their best in difficult conditions. Robinson was held prisoner in the notorious P.O.W. camps on the Yalu River for the next two years. He still suffered greatly from his wounds, to the extent that he was among the first batch of British prisoners (about 900 had fallen into Communist hands) released from north Korea. On 23 April 1953 Robinson was one of the wounded prisoners exchanged at Panmunjon, and was immediately flown to the British general hospital at Kure in Japan for evaluation and treatment before being repatriated.

He was medically discharged from the army in September 1953 as a result of his injuries. His war pension certificate noted an enduring 70% disability as a result of ‘gunshot wound left arm and hand - gunshot wound right hand - gunshot wound legs and thighs - malnutrition, privation and dysentery.’ Robinson’s Military Conduct was assessed as ‘Very Good’. “A capable and efficient NCO who was promoted to Acting Sergeant in the Field and has rendered valuable service to his Regiment.” The citation for his D.C.M. was approved by every operational level in Korea until it reached the War Office in London, where only two of the D.C.M. recommendations were authorised. Robinson’s Military Medal was gazetted on 8 December 1953, one of six M.M.s awarded to the Glosters for the battle of Imjin River along with two V.C.s, two D.S.O.s and three M.C.s (one to Lieutenant Costello).

Stanley Robinson died in Chatham on 31 March 1992.

Sold with the following related items:

i) Royal Mint case of issue for M.M., and named card box of issue for U.N. medal
ii) Four original photographs, each captioned and signed by the recipient as follows:
a. ‘British General Hospital in Kori, Japan. Awaiting flight home, April 53. Also pictured, Private Mercer who lost an eye and leg.’
b. ‘My release with the sick and wounded exchange at Panmunjon, April 23rd 1953. Pictured, Brig. Kendrew, American Escort and myself.’
c. ‘Home again, my daughter was born whilst I was on the Han River, December 1950.’
d. ‘Buckingham Palace, late 53.’
iii) Copy of the recipient’s Certificate of Service, which states: ‘As a reservist he was recalled to the Colours for service in Korea and took part in the heroic stand of the 1st Bn. Gloucestershire Regiment in the action on the Imjin River in April 1951. A capable and efficient N.C.O. who was promoted to Acting Sergeant in the field and has rendered valuable service to his regiment.’
iv) Original war pensions letter which states that his degree of disablement is assessed at 70% arising from ‘gunshot wound left arm and hand with median nerve palsy, gunshot wound right hand and contracture 4th and 5th fingers, gunshot wound legs and thighs, malnutrition and privation and dysentery.’
v) Four sides of letters written by recipient concerning the sale of his medals and giving some further detail, from which the following is extracted: ‘... Major General Farrar-Hockley’s book, The Edge of The Sword. I met him last at Buckingham Palace when he told me that I occupied a paragraph. It is correct to a point, unfortunately two of my Bren gunners were killed early on and so I had one of my very own! The Chinese People’s Army used Russian methods. Directed by tracer fire and bugles the first wave had the weapons, while the second picked up what they could from the dead. It did make life easier, but there were far too many of them. Anyway this is history, the Regiment was happy to have another Battle Honour, The American Presidential Citation and to be known as ‘The Glorious Glosters.’ We weren’t so pleased to do two years in a P.O.W. Camp!’