Orders, Decorations, Medals and Militaria

A rare Second War ‘Chindit Special Force’ M.M. group of five awarded to Sergeant Harold Bottomley, 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers, who was awarded his M.M. for gallantry during the ‘Defence of White City Stronghold’, whilst serving as the Platoon Sergeant of the Commando Platoon, No. 20 Column, in Brigadier ‘Mad Mike’ Calvert’s North Burma Chindit Force - For gallant and cool leadership during a dangerous and sustained Japanese attack on a vital sector of the stronghold’s perimeter

Military Medal, G.VI.R. (3451647 Sjt. H. Bottomley, Lan. Fus.); 1939-45 Star; Burma Star; Defence and War Medals 1939-45, together with original Chindit and Army Commando uniform patches, and Lancashire Fusiliers cap badge, nearly extremely fine (8) £4000-5000

M.M. London Gazette 26 April 1945.

The original July 1944 Recommendation - for a D.C.M. – by Major Shuttleworth, who commanded 20 Column at White City before taking over 50 Column, states: ‘Sergeant Bottomley was Platoon Sergeant of the Commando Platoon which held an important position. The Platoon position was under constant artillery and mortar fire and received mortar attacks for thirteen nights. During this time, Sergeant Bottomley kept his section in constant supply of ammunition and attended to casualties. This task was made extremely difficult as there was not a vestige of cover on the whole position.

In particular, on the night 13 April, when the enemy put in a very strong attack, knocking out 3 L.M.G. bunker positions, Sergeant Bottomley by his immediate grasp of the situation extricated the weapons and wounded men, re-sited the guns and kept the platoon in action during a very critical time. After this he returned to the damaged bunkers and attended to the wounded men.’

The DCM recommendation was endorsed by Major General Lentaigne, who took command of the Chindit Special Force after Orde Wingate was killed. In October 1944 it reached General Sir George James Giffard, C-in-C, 11th Army Group, who had been dismissed due to his inability to work with Admiral Mountbatten and General Joseph Stilwell, specifically for lack of initiative during the climactic battle of Imphal. As one of his final acts, Giffard, who strongly disliked the ‘Special Force’, approved the recommendation, but amended it to an award of the M.M.

Sergeant Harold Bottomley (1918-1993), a native of Chadderton, Oldham, Lancashire, originally enlisted in the Territorial Army battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers. He was one of a group of men from the Oldham/Leigh/Wigan area who transferred to the 1st Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers, a Regular Army unit, for war service. He was drafted out to India early in 1940. The 1st Battalion was based at Quetta on the North-West Frontier of India and Bottomley participated in a number of small actions against the Baluchi tribes in the border region, notably the Kojak Pass leading to southern Afghanistan.

In 1942 the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers moved to Cawnpore in North India for Internal Security duties, at the height of Gandhi’s ‘Quit India’ campaign. At the end of the year they were mobilized for operational service outside India, and moved to Jhansi in July 1943 to join the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, part of Major-General Orde Wingate’s Chindit forces. The Lancashires began a rigorous training program throughout the rainy season, designed to build up their fitness and give them the skills and confidence to fight successfully in the jungle.

Bottomley recalled that, after one arduous Physical Training session, the Commando Platoon was surprised by a sudden unannounced visitor. Amongst other questions, Wingate asked men directly if they were satisfied with their food. On receiving a politely negative reply, he said “I will attend to it.” Their rations were doubled.

Training for Long Range Penetration Operations

Wingate’s original concept was that the Chindits would move directly across country on foot, rather than follow roads or railway lines, and penetrate deep into the rear of the Japanese forces, relying on mobility and surprise to attack enemy supply lines through ambushes and destruction of vital infrastructure. They would be re-supplied by stores parachuted or dropped from transport aircraft.

The experience of the first Chindit operations in early 1943 caused Wingate to modify his tactics. His initial Chindit force had suffered high attrition, and only limited damage had been inflicted on the Japanese. He was allocated massive reinforcements (including the Lancashire Fusiliers) and lavishly resourced by direct orders from Churchill and Roosevelt. This time the Chindits would be flown directly into landing areas deep inside Burma and occupy selected defensive positions which would be fortified, supplied by air and defended by artillery and close air support. Some of the air assets would operate from improvised airstrips which would be built inside the defended areas. The ‘Strongholds’ would form safe harbours from which mobile forces (using mules to carry their munitions and heavy weapons) could fan out to strike at enemy concentrations and to demolish infrastructure. Wingate intended to defend most of the Strongholds for months on end, to draw enemy combat troops away from the frontlines.

Wingate rejected standard army command structures. He organised his men into a series of ‘Columns’, each of 400-500 soldiers, consisting of infantry platoons stiffened by task-specialised sub-units, such as heavy weapons and Vickers machine guns, Combat Engineers, Medical, Veterinary, Signals, Airforce liaison, Reconnaissance, etc. Seven or more Columns constituted a Brigade. The elite sub-unit was the ‘Commando Platoon’ assigned to each Column, each member of which was specially trained in demolition work and the creation and placement of booby-traps (now called Improvised Explosive Devices). They were the brainchild of Michael Calvert, one of the few senior officers who Wingate respected. Calvert was a Royal Engineer and a boxer, with extensive experience of demolitions and sabotage of infrastructure. He had commanded the former Bush Warfare School in Burma, which was evacuated to India, renamed 142 Commando and allocated to 77th Brigade for the First Chindit expedition in 1943. The term ‘Commando Platoon’ was a tribute to the fighting skills of the men of 142 Commando, the survivors of which became the instructors who trained the Chindit ‘demolition and mayhem’ sub-units.

The Lancashire Fusiliers formed the main element of No. 20 and No. 50 Columns. A fit, modest man who was a natural leader, Bottomley had risen to the rank of War-Substantive Sergeant. He was selected and trained as Platoon Sergeant of the Commando Platoon of No. 20 Column, which came under the overall command of Brigadier ‘Mad Mike’ Calvert. His Commando Platoon comprised three sections of Lancashire Fusiliers, one section of Royal Engineers, and one section of West Africans.

Operation Thursday – The Broadway and White City Strongholds

Number 20 Column was among the first Chindit forces that were flown into landing ground Broadway by glider and Dakota aircraft in the period March 5-12, 1944. Broadway was rapidly converted into the first Chindit Stronghold. As soon as all Calvert’s Columns had arrived, on March 9th he marched them west. Geography dictated that the major road and rail infrastructure supporting the Japanese armies in North and West Central Burma ran south-north along a single valley, known as the ‘railway valley’. The Planners had identified a location in the railway valley, suitable for fortification, which had an abundant water supply, could accommodate landing strips for aircraft and sat directly astride the road and railway, blocking them completely. Calvert intended to build a Stronghold and interdict the main supply route to the Japanese central and northern frontline units for an extended period.

The Chindits had to fight a bitter hand-to-hand battle to take Henu Hill before the Block could be established. Once it was in place, the Japanese realised the threat that it posed and mounted a series of counter-attacks, which failed to dislodge the Chindits. Soon the surrounding trees were draped with the collapsed canopies of parachutes used in supply drops, earning it the designation ‘White City’.

Calvert sent out ‘floater’ Columns and sub-units to attack and destroy Japanese forces (especially field artillery which they bought up to support assaults on the Stronghold), to confuse the enemy as to the exact strength of the British force based on White City, and to conduct ambushes, demolition and sabotage, especially targeting bridges and Japanese Headquarter buildings. The Lancashire Fusiliers Commando Platoons made a number of sorties, including to Mawlu and further south to Sepein.

The Battle of White City

Bottomley states that, after a period of ‘floating’ spent outside the perimeter hunting for enemy artillery positions, his unit was called in to White City, which was coming under mounting Japanese pressure. He describes the Stronghold as being sited on “scruffy, hilly ground, grassy, with the odd bushy tree, specially chosen for defence.” The Commando Platoon was responsible for holding the south-east corner of the perimeter. It overlooked an area of flat paddy fields and a tree line behind which was the Japanese-held town of Mawlu. Due east was a hilly, forested area, where the Japanese concentrated before launching their daily assaults at dusk and pre-dawn.

Bottomley explains how the Commandos built dug-out bunkers, slit-trenches covered with tree stumps to give overhead protection from mortar bombs, and placed belts of barbed wire and booby-traps across the forward slope in front of the bunkers to break up attacks. One of Bottomley’s challenges was to integrate a group of raw Scottish reinforcements who had just been flown in, who were all about five years younger than the seasoned Commandos. The men especially disliked a 5.9-inch Japanese mortar nicknamed the “coal scuttle,” which fired a bomb about five feet long which made a distant “Clump” as it was fired high into the air and came down on the Chindit bunkers some ten seconds later. He gives a detailed account of how he barely escaped a “coal scuttle” bomb which wounded Sergeant Jim Gibson.

“The Commando Platoon of 20 Column (1st Lancashire Fusiliers), had for some time, been carrying out hit-and-run and sabotage operations in the area. Now, they were deployed along the perimeter, with 2-inch mortars behind them. They had salvaged mortar bombs damaged in airdrops, attaching explosives to turn them into booby traps, which they placed along Japanese lines of approach. They planted landmines, dug pits filled with sharpened stakes, but nothing seemed to faze the enemy, who continued to attack [for thirteen consecutive nights]”. Chindits.wordpress.com refers

Bottomley provides a laconic outline of his M.M. action: “The night of the 13th April 1944 was a particularly hard one when the Japs did their normal softening up with the “coal scuttle” at dusk, assembled with roars, cries and bugle-blowing when darkness had fallen, then mortars and small arms fire and attacked using Bangalore Torpedoes to penetrate the wire in front of our positions.” He found one of his Lance-Corporals, who had been wounded the previous day, lying dead after a direct hit by a 3-inch mortar on the entrance to his bunker. “Our mortars were firing non-stop… the Japs broke through the line at our left [West African] section [and were beaten off] with ammunition boxes, held with the rope handles and swung like clubs. The Commando Platoon held their ground, and used more grenades and other ammunition during that night than on any other single night of the campaign.”

An eyewitness described how the “Japs rushed blindly into our minefields and over our booby traps, and were blown to pieces or else mowed down like autumn corn by our riflemen and machine-gunners.” Piling up over the Stronghold’s wire, hundreds died where they attempted to cross over; their bodies almost stripped to the bone by the explosions of mortars and grenades. Scores were killed as they tried to blow gaps in the wire. 

On April 17th the Japanese attackers gave up and withdrew southwards. An estimated 700 Japanese had been killed out of the 6,600 men who attempted to take White City. Transport pilots flying overhead reported that they could smell the stench of the unburied dead.

Post-War

After his demobilization, Bottomley was self-employed, and struggling to support his family. From 1980-83 he and his brother owned a garage. They leased out the showroom and petrol side of the business to a tenant who turned out to be a bad payer. Due to the tough economic times, Bottomley sold his medals in 1982. He sent a letter to Fusilier Harold Shippey, a member of the Commando Platoon, thanking him for “helping to earn this award”. “I did insist that the award to me of the M.M. was a platoon award and that by doing what was asked of [them] the lads contributed with some fine work when times were particularly hairy.” Letter to Dr Alan Stott refers
Harold Bottomley died on 11th November 1993, his 75th birthday.