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‘... the battle of Mount Longdon was won to a considerable extent by the persistence and determination of a relatively small group of soldiers who continued to slug it out for dominance against a well-entrenched enemy. In reports and reminiscences of the battle, the same names crop up again and again: McKay, McLaughlin, Weeks, Fuller, Gough, Gray, Pettinger. They represent a litany of uncompromising professionalism and focussed aggression.’
(Green-Eyed Boys, 3 Para and the Battle for Mount Longdon, by C. Jennings and A. Weale, refers)
The important Falklands War D.C.M. group of six awarded to Sergeant, later Captain, J. S. Pettinger, 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, who distinguished himself on countless occasions whilst serving as Patrol Commander D (Patrol) Company during 11 days of operations in and around the Mount Longdon area. Pettinger’s D Company were the ‘eyes and ears’ of 3 Para, and carried out extensive close target reconnaissance in and amongst enemy lines - in order to provide accurate descriptions of routes onto the objective, and detailed information on enemy strengths and locations prior to the assault on Mount Longdon.
Pettinger and his men ‘ghosted’ in and out, ‘We worked our way into the enemy positions and around to the north of the rocks, cautiously probing in where we could. Numerous enemies were seen and heard, often only a few metres away, and machine gun and mortar positions were found and noted.... I eventually checked my watch to see it was almost 04:30; we were still on the enemy position having been there for about 5 hours.
I took the decision to place our weapons down by our sides and just walk off the position heading north; a tactic used in Northern Ireland years before. To our surprise and fright, we discovered we had walked through several occupied enemy trenches with men talking. Nobody stopped us. Once clear, we ran as fast as possible back westwards towards our first RV.’
During the preparation for the attack on Mount Longdon Sergeant Pettinger completed six close target reconnaissances against the objective, and once completed, ‘On the night of 11th/12th June, Sergeant Pettinger acted as a guide for B Company for their part in the battalion night attack onto Mount Longdon and was able to place them in such a good starting position that the attack came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Once the battle had commenced he was a constant source of information and advice to the Company Commander, while acting with dash and determination during the many assaults against strong points on that night, killing at least three enemy.’
Distinguished Conduct Medal, E.II.R., 2nd issue (24159222 Sgt J S Pettinger Para); U.N. Medal, on UNFICYP ribbon; General Service 1962-2007, 1 clasp, Northern Ireland (24159222 Pte. J. S. Pettinger Para); South Atlantic 1982, with rosette (24159222 Sgt J S Pettinger Para) name and unit partially officially corrected; Jubilee 2002, unnamed as issued ; Volunteer Reserves Service Medal, E.II.R. (Capt J S Pettinger RAMC) mounted as originally worn, with named card boxes of issue for last two medals, generally very fine or better (6) £100,000-£120,000
D.C.M. London Gazette 8 October 1982:
‘Sergeant Pettinger is a Patrol Commander D (Patrol) Company 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment. On the nights of the 2nd/3rd June Sergeant Pettinger was Commander of one of a number of patrols tasked to gain information about enemy forces holding Mount Longdon.
Sergeant Pettinger’s mission was to recce routes onto Mount Longdon with the aim of placing a rifle company in the best possible position for a night assault later. This meant closing with the enemy who at times were only a few metres away in order to gain his information. This he did with great success on four occasions over the two nights, displaying a high standard of skill and coolness, knowing that capture would lead to the compromise of the battalion plans. The information gained led to him being able to produce accurate descriptions of routes onto the objective, detailed information on enemy strengths and locations, and on the night of 8 June to lead a platoon along the assault route in a rehearsal for the planned attack. Once again he closed with the enemy, gained further information, and cleared more routes, again with great coolness. On the night of 11th/12th June, Sergeant Pettinger acted as a guide for B Company for their part in the battalion night attack onto Mount Longdon and was able to place them in such a good starting position that the attack came as a complete surprise to the enemy. Once the battle had commenced he was a constant source of information and advice to the Company Commander, while acting with dash and determination during the many assaults against strong points on that night, killing at least three enemy. During the preparation for the attack on Mount Longdon Sergeant Pettinger completed six close target reconnaissances against the objective. He displayed the highest standards of professional skill, alertness, accuracy of reporting, coolness in the face of the enemy as well as courage during the actual assault.’
John Stuart Pettinger was born in Blackburn, Lancashire, and joined the Army in September 1968 at the age of 15 as a Junior soldier of The Parachute Regiment. He spent two years serving with the Infantry Junior Leaders Battalion at Oswestry, after which he completed ‘P Company’. Pettinger was posted to the 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment in early 1971, and he provides the following previously unpublished detailed and graphic account of his operational service:
‘I was initially due to serve with 2 Para, however the under 18 rule had just been imposed for troops in Northern Ireland (NI) which resulted in getting posted to 3 Para instead.
During 1972, after a very arduous physical and mental selection phase in South Wales, I joined D (Patrol) Company 3 Para, (also known as Patrol Company). I stayed with the Company several years and returned as a Sergeant in 1981 after various postings; including numerous tours in NI both on the border and in Belfast with the Company (Coy) and also as a Corporal instructing recruits at Browning Barracks, Aldershot for two years during 1976-78, which was both enjoyable and fulfilling. Additionally, I had two tours in Malaya and attended the Jungle Warfare Instructor Course.
In 1978 I attended the SAS selection and after a month of arduous training I had to withdraw due to injuries. However instead of being ‘Returned to Unit” (RTU’d) which was the normal action for injuries, I was kept on at Hereford, helping out on the Training Wing and was to await the next selection phase. After approximately a month I was directed to attend the selection for what was commonly known as ‘The Det’ or ‘14 Intelligence Company’ and now is officially named the Special Reconnaissance Regiment (SRR; part of the UK Special Forces). I passed the difficult selection phase and was deployed as an Operator for the next couple of years. Skills learnt from this work I utilised and taught later on, both with Patrol Coy and also in civilian life.
In 1981, as I re-joined 3 Para in Germany, the Patrols were reorganised as a Platoon (Pl), forming part of Support (Sp) Coy and was soon to be posted to Tidworth, as well as a further Northern Ireland deployment on the border. Over the next few months, my main task was to organise and deliver the training for the Patrol Platoon members in preparation for that NI deployment, which was a highly successful tour for the Platoon.
During the early part of 1982, when the Battalion (Bn) was based in Tidworth, the Patrols were directed to reform as a company, D (Patrol) Company, therefore more men suitable for Patrol Coy work were required. With another Patrol’s SNCO, we ran a selection phase in South Wales for almost a month. Towards the end of that selection (April 2nd), we were directed to return immediately to the Bn at Tidworth and be ready to deploy the next morning.
We were to discover that night that the Argentinian Forces had invaded and occupied the Falkland Islands and South Georgia. Nobody was quite sure quite where this was at this stage, but we were soon to find out.
Political wrangling and logistic preparation held us back until the 8th April, when we were to join SS Canberra, (a requisitioned cruise liner) at Southampton. We sailed the next day heading south. This was to be a long six-week voyage, where all basic skills were honed, blood given, and fitness training continued. We also received several intelligence briefings and lectures and were able to conduct some map studying; still not knowing quite where we were going.
Additionally, it included some time spent on Ascension Island where the Bn practised beach landings from Landing Craft Utility (LSU) and we were able to test fire and check zero our weapons, including the Battalion support weapons and sniper rifles.
The Company order of battle (ORBAT) was organised and my Patrol consisted of myself, Lance Corporal Mark (Zip) Hunt as radio operator, Private Yanto Evans as gunner and Private Richard (Dickie) Absolon MM (posthumous) as lead scout and sniper.
During the afternoon of the 19th of May, the Bn “crossed decks” by LCU from SS Canberra onto HMS Intrepid. There was very little room on a fully complimented ship to carry a further Bn of Paratroopers and all of their kit and equipment. Later that day, a Sea King helicopter ditched astern of HMS Intrepid just before landing. Carrying members of 22 SAS, it had lost power and control. An incredibly sad night when we lost twenty-two men, including a couple of personal friends, before we had engaged the enemy.
Two days later, during the early hours of 21st of May, 3 Para prepared to move in the darkness from HMS Intrepid by LCU to land on the beaches around Port San Carlos. Instead, 2 Para were to utilise the LCU’s first for their landing which delayed our progress until daylight. The beaches were not marked for our landings and the LCU Skippers were extremely careful not to hit any rocks on the seabed. After searching for a suitable drop off point (DOP) we eventually deployed a little short from land and I stepped off into waist deep, freezing water.
The Patrol Coy undertook various tasks around the settlement, including putting an early warning protective screen around the Bn whilst the Bridgehead was being prepared. My task was to get as far north as possible to give the earliest warning of any Argentinian aircraft approaching at low-level, using the valleys to avoid radar. I found a location approximately 12 miles north of San Carlos, on the high ground between Foul Bay and Concordia Bay. This proved a very difficult night move due to the trackless terrain, the possibility of enemy activity and the weight we carried; each man had approximately 140lbs (approx. 64kg) of kit and equipment.
The weight in our four Bergans, (rucksacks), included three radios, spare batteries, a hand generator, a change of clothes, seven days striped down GS rations, (tins), sleeping bag and poncho, extra GPMG ammunition and all of the ancillary bits required. Our webbing equipment with ammunition, bayonet, grenades and water, and we also had our various weapons.
Over the next few days, from this location, we activated several 'Air Warning Red' by radio allowing the Bn to take cover from possible air attacks. We were also able to listen to the BBC World Service on our HF radio.
On the 27th of May, the Bn along with Patrol Coy HQ and other patrols received orders to move east, cross country and towards Teal Inlet, thirty miles (45km) away. I was informed via radio and had hoped to link up with the Bn at Port San Carlos and move with them, however, by the time we arrived they had already left some hours beforehand, leaving us to catch up. We managed to jump onto a Chinook helicopter for part of the way and re-joined the Bn the next day, where they had dug in a defensive position around Teal Inlet. When we arrived, the Patrols were redeployed to place a security screen around the location. At this point, we had been on the move for two days and this night became particularly difficult due to tiredness, and the heavy snow that fell through the night.
On the 29th May, we received the news that 2 Para had attacked and secured Goose Green although several soldiers had been killed and many more injured including the Commanding Officer (CO), Lt Col H Jones who was killed. He was later awarded the Victoria Cross. The next morning was bright and sunny, and we had the chance to re-organise and rest for a few hours at Teal Inlet.
On 30th May, the Battalion started the move further east towards Estancia House, another twenty miles (30k) away. Here again, the terrain was extremely difficult underfoot while the weather changeable with biting winds, heavy rain and blizzard conditions. The Bn was moving in light order (webbing and any day sacks), whereas the Patrols carried their Bergans as tasking was unknown and therefore all kit and equipment could be required.
Just before last light, the Bn stopped in a layup area where several Patrols received orders to continue onto Estancia House and the surrounding areas to check for enemy and secure the location. My Patrol tasking was to escort four men from 9 Squadron Royal Engineers (9 Sqn) onto the western slopes of Mount Estancia, past and NE of the settlement where a a local man had reported a mine field. This included crossing the tidal River Estancia and enduring atrocious sleet and blizzard conditions. No mines were found.
The Bn moved into the area by the 1st of June, and the companies established in defensive positions in the mountains surrounding Estancia where the Bn HQ made their base. That day, I lead my patrol on a clearance patrol and reconnaissance (recce), further over Mount Estancia and onto Mount Vernet. We almost stumbled into an Argentinian position so stopped short to watch and listen before approaching very carefully, ready to attack it. Fortunately, it appeared to possibly be an Argentinian radio-relay station which had recently been abandoned in haste. A lot of equipment had been left, including radio logs, maps, vehicle batteries, tents, sleeping bags, clothing and much more. We gathered all of the paperwork together and returned it to the Bn HQ for crucial intelligence, and I debriefed on the patrol work. A couple of days later, I noticed that some of that equipment (tents etc) had been gathered and used around the Bn.
The next day I was tasked with the first recce or close target reconnaissance (CTR), onto Mount Longdon approximately twelve miles (18k) away to gain information about enemy positions and possible routes onto the mountain in preparation for the Bn attack. We were very aware that a compromise during this patrol onto the enemy position could possibly alert the enemy to the Bn’s intentions and our high “prone to capture” situation was certainly not favourable.
The four of us moved out before last light to cover some of the ground in daylight, as just east of Estancia are areas of ‘rivers of rocks’ which are open expanses of bare, loose rock, some of which were car size, and very difficult to cross even in daylight. At the same time, other patrols conducted similar recces on various areas forward of the Bn location.
I aimed for Murell Bridge which is about three miles (5k) short of Mt. Longdon to use it to cross the river. Tactically not very sound, but at that point we had no idea of the depth of the river, which we found out on later recces. This became our Patrol’s final rendezvous (FRV) to be used if we got split up. We approached in the darkness and spent time observing the bridge for any enemy movement. Our lead scout, Dickie Absolon, moved carefully forward to have a closer look and check for any booby traps etc. All was clear, and we quickly crossed at the bridge at around 22:00 moving further forward to a position by a shallow peat bank, crossing the Furze Bush stream, which was to later to become the start line for the Bn. This was approximately 600-800 meters short of the forward edge of the concave slopes of Mt. Longdon, and where I left Zip and Yanto, making this our first rendezvous point (RV), with the orders to open fire onto the mountain if they saw any form of firefight as it could possibly be Dickie and I trying to extract after a compromise and hopefully they could divert some attention.
Dickie and I crawled forward and onto the edge of the western end of the rocky out-crops of Longdon, unaware of any possible minefields; I was astonished at the height of some of the rocks containing the defended position that was in some depth eastwards. We worked our way into the enemy positions and around to the north of the rocks, cautiously probing in where we could. Numerous enemies were seen and heard, often only a few meters away, and machine gun and mortar (Mor) positions were found and noted. The time on the position was forgotten and went very quickly, as I had told the other two patrol members that if we were not back by 04:30 to report us missing and move back to the FRV at 05:00 so that they would be clear before first light. I eventually checked my watch to see it was almost 04:30; we were still on the enemy position having been there for about 5 hours.
I took the decision to place our weapons down by our sides and just walk off the position heading north; a tactic used in NI years before. To our surprise and fright, we discovered we had walked through several occupied enemy trenches with men talking. Nobody stopped us. Once clear, we ran as fast as possible back westwards towards our first RV. Zip and Yanto had left so we continued to move quickly back to the FRV. We caught up with them a short time later.
We returned to the Bn and I gave my report and de-brief to the CO Lt Col Hew Pike before re-preparing our equipment, cleaning weapons and then getting a couple of hours rest.
It became obvious that the CO was keen to move the Bn forward and attack Longdon as soon as possible, as the Brigade plan was now to move without delay onto the hills and mountains surrounding Port Stanley, with 3 PARA to attack and capture Mount Longdon, 45 Cdo to attack the mountain called Two Sisters and 42 Cdo onto Mount Harriet.
A few hours later, we deployed again back toward Longdon for a further recce. Unknown to us, the Bn later moved forward and was preparing to attack. We completed our recce, like to the first one, gathered further information of enemy positions and again walked off, this time avoiding the trenches. We linked up with Zip and Yanto and I was informed of the Bn move forward as Zip had received it by radio. We walked back very carefully, in fog, to the Bn front line where the soldiers were aware that in front of them somewhere was the enemy. We approached very cautiously to avoid a ‘blue on blue’ situation and eventually we heard the noise of men digging shell scrapes and voices. We went to ground and shouted that we were approaching their front line, which worked - thankfully.
However, there was to be a delay due to the arrival of General Moore taking command of Brigade operations. This delay at least gave us the chance to reassess the situation and conduct further patrols on and around Mt Longdon.
The Bn moved back to the mountains around Estancia and we (Patrol Coy) continued to conduct recce’s onto and around the area of Mt. Longdon, gaining more information with each patrol. This intelligence gave us the ability to build a large earthen model of the mountain and enemy positions therein, from which the CO and the Companies could use to brief from. During this patrolling phase, two patrols had contact and a fire fight with the enemy near Murell bridge, extracting without injuries.
Anti-tank mines had been found in an area west of Mt. Longdon, although no mines or markings for mines were found in the areas to the north and NW of Longdon which, on many occasions, were the lines of our approach and exit from the mountain. Later we were to find out that there were scattered anti-personnel (AP) mines in this area.
On the 11th of June, 3 Para started its advance onto Longdon to conduct a silent night attack with the Patrols marking the start line at Furze Bush stream. My task was to get B Coy across the start line then assist with casualties and prisoners of war (POW), but tactics and battles will always change once across the start line and into contact with the enemy.
After crossing the area of the start line, one of my patrols was to lead 6 Pl to the western slopes of Longdon and my patrol approached with B Coy HQ between 4 and 5 Pl. It was a bright moon-lit night and we were on an open concave slope with very little cover, somewhere I had already been on numerous occasions. B Coy had almost made it silently to the forward edge of the enemy positions when a Section Commanders (Sect Comd) stood on an AP mine. This explosion and the accompanying eerie scream were the start of what was to be a very hard night of close quarter battle, followed by two days of occupation on Longdon under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire.
Following that first mine explosion, the enemy opened fire at us in the open ground where we took cover and returned fire. The sky turned red with tracer and chaos ensued. I managed to locate 5 Pl Comd and then 4 Pl Comd, showing them a centre axis to aim for amongst the rocks through the skyline that was now familiar to me having sketched it previously.
The men had their initial orders to capture this mountain which was now their focus. With enemy fire pouring down on us, the Pl’s broke down to sections, half sections and pairs, skirmishing forward with bayonets fixed and grenades ready. My Patrol stayed with Coy HQ and we skirmished towards and onto the mountain.
After an extremely hard close-quarter bloody fight, B Coy reached the top of the mountain and came to a stand-still with many men killed and injured. They reorganised and prepared to continue the push further forward when it was decided that A Coy could now take up the fight.
Our own Naval Gunfire Support was employed onto the mountain within 50 meters of our position. I was tasked to locate A Coy and guide them forward and through B Coy position and onto the mountain. I left my Patrol in cover on the top of the position and worked my way back down to familiar voices of A Coy and then showed them the way up towards and through the B Coy position. A Coy then moved eastwards along the mountain, continued the fight through, finally securing the position approximately nine hours after crossing the start line.
That night, 17 men of 3 Para were killed and many more injured. Many enemies were killed and injured.
12th of June: a short while after A Coy went firm and started to reorganise themselves, I was tasked with clearing between the Coy areas on the mountain for any enemy stragglers. We came across some enemy in bunkers and tents which gave us a few fraught moments, but without resistance, they were now POW’s and were passed back through the Coys to an area at the north west end of Longdon near our own Regimental Aid Post (RAP).
Immediately after this, our next task was to lead a Support (Sp) Coy group of a Milan detachment and two Sustained Fire (SF) gun groups to the forward edge of the position as quickly as possible. We collected the men and weapons and moved quickly along the northern edge of the position, still finding enemy stragglers.
A short while later, this task was cancelled, and the Sp Coy men returned to their original positions while we dropped back through B Coy position. Longdon was being bombarded with artillery and mortar fire throughout the day and we continued taking more casualties. The ‘in-coming’ artillery and mortars were constant and accurately being controlled by an enemy Observation Post (OP) on Mount Tumbledown immediately to our south. 3 Para had six more soldiers killed and a number of others seriously wounded.
As a patrol, we had several remarkably close encounters with the enemy bombardment, being almost buried by one explosion and being blown off our feet with another, many more were too close for comfort.
I decided that we would move off the mountain for a short period and collected another Patrol as we headed west. We had been on the go for over two days and desperately needed to rest before we were required and re-tasked again. I lead the men westwards about six hundred meters to a group of rocks where we rested, cleaned weapons and had some food. During this time, the Bn HQ was organising the evacuation of casualties and dead.
After a few hours, we received a radio message from the CO, who was on Longdon between A and B Coys, ordering us to attend a briefing. A short while later we arrived at the NW corner of the position where the RAP and some of Bn HQ were based. Whilst stopped, I left the men together with other Patrol Coy members and made my way towards the CO’s position. This was quickly curtailed as a few seconds after leaving the men and about 10 meters from them, an artillery or mortar round landed amongst them. This was devastating, injuring most of those close by. Zip had turned to cover me and had his back to the explosion which threw him to the ground. He was just winded however Dickie had taken a large piece of shrapnel through his helmet and through his head. Unfortunately, he died a little while later. There were four or five other injuries from this explosion.
The brief from the CO was for us to locate and destroy the enemy mortars that were close to Wireless Ridge and firing accurately onto Longdon. We knew the artillery location was in Stanley as we had seen it before.
My patrol was now just the two of us, so I gathered another Patrol to assist and after a discussion with a SNCO in the Bn Mortar (Mor) Pl, we moved forward of the Bn and onto the western end of Wireless Ridge. Here we could see many Argentinian troops, some very close to us and others heading off the mountains towards Stanley. Additionally, we could see the enemy artillery on the racecourse in Stanley however the enemy mortars were out of sight to us. We were able to use a search and destroy method with our mortars and after some time the enemy mortars stopped. Whether we hit them, or they realised what was happening and left we will never know.
During that period, I radioed many times to our artillery for a fire mission onto the enemy guns in Stanley which were still highly active. Our guns were busy adjusting fire further onto Wireless Ridge for the pending 2 Para attack, so we were not given the priority. Later that day, just before last light, we were eventually given the fire mission which we used effectively against those enemy guns on the racecourse.
Later, I sent the additional Patrol back to the Bn area and myself, Zip and one other (John Wilson) stayed forward to watch the 2 Para assault onto Wireless Ridge.
The next day (14th of June), 3 Para prepared to move through 2 Para and attack Moody Brook and the racecourse. As orders were being given by the CO that afternoon, the shout came that the Argentinians had surrendered.’
Pettinger’s gallantry during eleven days of operations in the Mount Longdon area, including taking part in the assault, was recognised with the award of the D.C.M., one of five awarded to the Parachute Regiment for the Falklands conflict. Private R. Absolon was also recognised and was awarded the M.M. posthumously. Pettinger is also frequently mentioned in several publications including: Green-Eyed Boys, 3 Para and the Battle for Mount Longdon by Christian Jennings and Adrian Weale; Excursion To Hell, Mount Longdon, A Universal Story of Battle by Lance Corporal V. Bramley, 3 Para; and Three Days in June, 3 Para, Mount Longdon, by Private James O’Conell, 3 Para, in which Pettinger is quoted and mentioned extensively.
After the Falklands War, ‘I remained with the Company and was promoted to Colour Sergeant (C/Sgt). In 1983 was posted to the Infantry Training Battle School at Brecon as an Instructor on the Senior NCO division. Towards the end of 1983, I returned to 3 Para and back to Patrol Coy as a Pl Comd. Later I became the Company Quartermaster Sergeant (CQMS) for Sp Coy. I was promoted to WO2 and, Company Sergeant Major of B Coy in 3 Para and later served as the Senior Permanent Staff Instructor with 10 Para (TA) in North London for the period 1986-1989.
Later in 1989, I joined 2 Para for a further tour of NI on the border. In 1990 I became the Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant (RQMS) for the Logistic Bn and was advised that I would eventually get promoted to Warrant Officer Class One (WO1) as the Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) of 2 Para.
Earlier than expected, in November of 1990, an RSM post became available in Holland at the Support Unit for UK troops at Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT). With a pending move to 2 Para this was not something I wanted; however, my orders were to take the post. Starting in early 1991, I remained there for the next two years.
I finished my regular service in August 1993 and the next day joined the Non Regular Permanent Staff with the 10th Battalion The Parachute Regiment (10 Para TA) as a CQMS. After approximately six years, because of defence cuts, 10 Para was disbanded, and I transferred to another TA Unit of the local Royal Logistics Corp. This lasted for just over a year, before I was commissioned as a Captain and became the Permanent Staff Administration Officer (PSAO) with 144 Parachute Medical Squadron in Hornsey; where I served for a further three years before finally retiring from the Army.
During my time as SPSI with 10 Para in North London, I learned how to sail and started getting qualified in the sailing world, which has allowed me to work in that field since retiring from the Army.
I had served a total of 36 years.’ (Ibid)
Sold with the following original and related archive of material: Climeter gun elevation instrument liberated from an Argentinian position; 3 Identity Discs; British Forces Identity Card; Regular Army Certificate of Service; 3 Para Battle Group Battle for Mount Longdon 30 Year Anniversary Commemorative Medallion, base metal; 2 annotated topographical maps showing the physical geography of the Falklands, which were carried by the recipient on campaign; 2 copied Argentinian operations maps of the Falklands; Argentinian burns blanket; various letters of congratulation on the occasion of the award of the recipient’s D.C.M., including from: General Sir Anthony Farrar-Hockley, G.B.E., K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C., Colonel Commandant, The Parachute Regiment; Lieutenant General Sir Richard Trent, K.C.B., HQ South East District; Major General J. J. Moore, O.B.E., M.C., HQ Commando Forces, Royal Marines; Brigadier M. J. A. Wilson, O.B.E., M.C., HQ 5 Infantry Brigade; Colonel G. D. Farrell, M.B.E., Regimental Headquarters, The Parachute Regiment; Major J. S. Williams, D.C.M. Para; John Nott, KCB, Secretary of State for Defence; Arthur Davidson, QC MP; Honours in Confidence copy of D.C.M. original recommendation; photocopy of Royal Court Telegram of congratulation from HRH The Prince Wales to the recipient, dated 8 October 1982; newspaper cuttings; typed resume of recipient’s service career; The Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces Falklands Memorial Service, Order of Service, dated 1 October 1982; with a large number of annotated photographs from various stages of his service including: ‘D’ Patrol during the Falklands War showing members of the patrol on active service; a Daily Mirror press photograph of all the members of 3 Para decorated for gallantry standing alongside Sergeant Ian McKay, VC’s widow, one of Sergeant Pettinger at Buckingham Palace with Brian Faulkner after they had both been invested with the D.C.M. by HRH The Queen; four photographs recording HRH The Prince of Wales’s private visit to 3 Para during their tour of Cyprus in 1986; a number from 1987 when he returned to the Falklands and revisited a number of important sites from the war (also with a topographical map used during the visit and a Stanley Minefield and Area Clearance Situation Map as at 1 May 1986); several from a Change of Command Ceremony for the C-in-C Central Europe at Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) Headquarters in Holland, when the recipient officiated as Parade RSM (as recorded in Pegasus April 1992).
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